Posts Tagged ‘Wilson’
Разрыв как раз 10% – критический уровень
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Andrew Wilson, a Ukraine expert with the European Council on Foreign Relations, said the size of the gap between Yanukovich and Tymoshenko would be crucial in the first round.
“Less than 10 percent and Tymoshenko is confident she can close it in the second round. 10-15 percent and the election will be close. More than 15 percent is difficult,” he said. (отсюда)
Как создавался СПС
Virtual Politics p. 125:
Yeltsin’s victory in 1996 convinced the presidential administration to play for higher stakes in the 1999 Duma elections. This time the dual-shot strategy was a big success, both for the Unity project and the highly successful relaunch of the liberal right as the Union of Right Forces (URF). Unity’s apparent leadership had an excellent public image (despite the party being mainly financed by the likes of Berezovskii and Aksenenko); the URF used Irina Khakamada to front its campaign instead of the highly unpopular Chubais (whose United Energy Systems provided much of the real finance) [reference to Mukhin's Информационная война в России с. 216], and the so-called ‘Aluminium Party’ oligarchs such as Oleg Deripaska of Siberian Aluminium whose representative on the party list, Konstantin Remchukov, became surprisingly protectionist for a liberal politician once he was ensconced in the Duma. Before the 1995 elections Yeltsin had privately declared that ‘Chubais means minus 10 per cent for Our Home is Russia’ [Mukhin p. 223] now he and the others were kept safely in the background. Although not so closely linked to the Kremlin, Yabloko (6 per cent) was much more tightly integrated into the pie system than its public positions suggested. (Given its traditional prominence on economic policy committees, it was particularly targeted by Russian banks.) According to Aleksei Mukhin, Yavlinskii ‘in fact sold his political image to at least two groups – to Gusinskii’s [Most] Group and Khodorkovskii’s [Yukos] Group – obviously. They appeared as sponsors of his election campaign in 1999 and, accordingly, later received the Yabloko faction in the capacity of a group lobbyist for their interests in the State Duma.’ [p. 6] Yabloko was also increasingly dependent on Sergei Zverev’s PR development company for its campaigning technology, which was closely linked to the Most Group. As Gusinskii also backed Fatherland-All Russia and was soon out of favour with the Kremlin, Yabloko became increasingly close to Khodorkovskii. Indeed, in the Duma the powers-that-be sought to turn the URF and Yabloko into ‘interchangeable twins’, forcing them to compete for the Kremlin’s favour. It was relatively easy to ignore the fact that the two had different electorates; that they had different sponsors, however, would create trouble in the years ahead.
Интересная глава в биографии нынешнего главного редактора “Независимой газеты” Ремчукова (найти его в книге по индексу нельзя).
Антикомпромат. Гозман
В Virtual Politics Гозман назван среди other key project (СПС) designers, вместе с Петром Щедровицким, Эльдаром Янбухтиным из “Контакт PR” и Гельманом (p. 99).
На “Антикомпромате” об этом ничего нет.
КУДА ЕДЕТ «КРЫША» РОССИИ ПОД НАЗВАНИЕМ ФСБ?
Эта ссылка – из Virtual Politics, p. 292 note 62. Отрывки из “ФСБ взрывает Россию”. Это – оттуда же.
Protocols of the Elders of Zion
Virtual politics p. 4: Although its publishing history remains sketchy, the Okhrana almost certainly played the key role in the ongoing reworking of the various editions of the era’s most notorious forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1903 and after). Piotr Rachkovskii, the head of the Foreign Agentura and a compulsive forger [...] most probably organised the plundering of previous works by Maurice Joly, Elie de Cyon and Hermann Goedsche to cobble together the Protocols. The most likely author was another agent, Sergei Nilus.
Мысль о чекистском крюке у Эндрю Уилсона
Virtual Politics p. 18: [A] key reason why the Soviet Union collapsed with such apparent ease was that those who noisily defended the system in public were all too often the very same people who were laundering its assets in private. On the other hand, the KGB was the one institution that was not fatally weakened in the late Soviet period: hence the survival of its personnel and methodology.
Далее следует ссылка на одну из книг Олега Гордиевского.
Перед этим Уилсон цитирует отрывок из книги Александра Яковлева, в котором говорится, что проект перестройки мог бы быть более успешным, если бы “преследование инакомыслия… не убило почти полностью социальный идеализм и доверие, посеяв апатию, цинизм, неверие и моральную усталость”.
По мысли Уилсона, КГБ стравливал диссидентов друг с другом, и когда они могли оказаться полезными, они не смогли преодолеть взаимное недоверие, посеянное за годы “активных мероприятий”.
Это объясняет недееспособность диссидентов, но разложение советской системы, надо понимать, охватывало более широкие слои населения, и особенно номенклатуры (“the depth of the rot”), и причины этого не объясняются, как не объясняется и то, почему гниением не был затронут, или был затронут в меньшей степени, сам КГБ. Впрочем, пафос воззвания Черкесова о чекистском крюке как раз и заключался в том, что разложение чекистского сообщества необходимо остановить.
